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ABSTRACT: The 2020 COVID-19 outbreak has caused significant disruption to economic and
social systems. New York City, as the United States’ largest city and among the nation’s most
densely populated, was an early epicenter of the crisis. Modifications to the design, planning
and operations of the city’s public realm have been important components of the city’s overall
response to mitigate the effects of the pandemic while also facilitating economic recovery and
providing social, educational, and recreational opportunities for city residents. This
commentary provides an overview of New York City’s urban design responses to COVID-19,
highlighting some of the successes and limitations of the city’s programs. We conclude by
arguing that, in order to be effective, short-term crisis response efforts such as these must
eventually be turned into government policies that not only address immediate urgent crises
but also begin to facilitate durable long-term recovery and address longstanding systemic
inequalities and vulnerabilities.
Keywords: COVID-19; coronavirus; economic development; New York city; urban design; public
space; disaster recovery.
1. COVID-19 as an Urban Design and Planning Challenge
The COVID-19 outbreak presents unique challenges to urban planners and designers, whose
role in disaster mitigation and recovery is typically more pertinent after events such as
hurricanes, tsunamis, typhoons, wildfires, mudslides, earthquakes, terror attacks, and industrial
accidents. While these types of disasters cause extensive and debilitating damage to urban
assets like homes, businesses, schools, roads, and power systems, pandemics are different
because they do not cause physical destruction, even if they do take human lives and disrupt
economic and social networks. Nonetheless, efforts to prevent the spread of the virus, mitigate
its associated societal impacts, and facilitate economic and social recovery will have important
urban planning and urban design components as cities re-evaluate how public space is designed
and used. Lessons from previous physical disasters, therefore, can still inform planners’ ongoing
responses to COVID-19, while these current efforts will also contribute to an ever-evolving
understanding of effective disaster recovery strategies for future events. This commentary
examines New York City’s reimagining of its public realm in response to COVID-19 and provides
some preliminary observations about these efforts.
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According to New York City’s online COVID-19 tracker, the city of 8.3 million residents had
495,588 confirmed cases (plus 79,510 probable cases) and 21,699 confirmed deaths (plus 4,949
probable deaths) from COVID-19 between the first reported case on February 29, 2020 and
January 25, 2021. Over this chaotic 11 months, the city’s physical landscape was drastically
transformed in response to the pandemic. Streets, sidewalks, parks, plazas, and schoolyards
now serve a host of new functions that were relatively rare, if not non-existent, before the
pandemic. These rapid and widespread changes offer valuable opportunities for critical
reflection and analysis about the way that design and management of public spaces can be
used as tools for crisis management.
New York City is only one among thousands of cities across the world that has responded to the
COVID-19 pandemic by reimaging its public realm. London (UK), Paris (France), Milan (Italy),
Melbourne (Australia), Budapest (Hungary), Houston (TX, USA), Oakland (CA, USA), and many
others have also used public space as a mechanism for adaptation to a “new normal” defined
by social distancing on the one hand, and on the other, the critical need to provide safe space
for recreation and commerce (Newman 2020; Honey-Rosés et al. 2020; Dunning and Nurse
2021; Glaser and Krizek 2020; Bereitschaft and Scheller 2020). The city has created new
initiatives within its Department of Transportation (DOT) and Department of Education (DOE)
focused on creatively utilizing public space to facilitate safe economic activity, schooling, and
recreation. These include DOT’s Open Streets, Open Restaurants, Open Storefronts, Play
Streets, and Cool Streets programs, as well as the DOE’s Outdoor Learning Initiative. While the
city’s efforts have been ambitious, due to the nature of the pandemic, they have also been
constantly evolving, often confusing, and sometimes contradictory, as the following examples
will illustrate.
The challenges of creating effective COVID-19 mitigation and recovery efforts are due in part to
the city’s physical landscape. New York City is the densest large city in the US, with 27,016
residents per square mile (10,431 per km2). New Yorkers live and work in smaller and more
tightly packed spaces than most other Americans.1 Pre-pandemic lives revolved heavily around
public spaces in what Jacobs (1961: 54) called the “sidewalk ballet” of “animated city streets” as
well as parks, museums, restaurants, theaters, and cafes. Social distancing is exceedingly
difficult in a city built on human interaction. New York has also had to balance other conflicting
priorities such as the safety of residents versus the needs of the entrepreneurs who operate the
city’s 220,000 businesses (City of New York 2015), and the health of school children versus the
needs of working parents. These priorities do not always align, and conflicts sometimes arise.
This preliminary commentary cannot fully capture the complex and dynamic nature of the city’s
response to COVID-19, which is still ongoing. But it can provide context for making some critical
1

While no definitive data on housing sizes exist, recent studies suggest that the average size of attached units in
New York City (91.3% of the city’s housing stock) is 866 ft2 (Plitt 2016). Single-family homes, which comprise 61.3%
of the housing in the rest of the US, average about 1,600–1,655 ft2 and also contain backyards, basements,
garages, and other amenities rare in New York City (Pinsker 2019).

PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT: Please cite from published version
observations about how the crisis has affected the city’s physical landscape and what urban
planners and designers elsewhere can learn from the city’s experience.
2. New York City’s Open Streets Program
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, New York City had been slowly rethinking the function of
its streets, parks, and sidewalks, starting with the administration of former Mayor Michael
Bloomberg beginning in 2002. In 1997 the city had 119 miles of bicycle paths of any kind (New
York City Department of City Planning 1997) but had installed an additional 1,100 miles by 2018
(New York City Department of Transportation 2019). The DOT Plaza Program has created 74
new public plazas on 30 acres of converted streets since its creation in 2007. Beginning in 2008,
the Weekend Walks and Summer Streets programs employed temporary street closures to
enhance pedestrian and recreational use. The Street Seats initiative, launched in 2015, allowed
applicants to build seating areas in on-street parking spaces to serve as restaurant seating,
“pocket parks,” and other uses. It was from this base of programs and experiences that the city
was able to expand its efforts once the COVID-19 crisis exposed the need for additional ways to
facilitate social distancing in public spaces.
The city’s first confirmed case of COVID-19 was reported on February 29, 2020 although
evidence suggests that the virus was already widespread in the city before that date (Carey and
Glanz 2020). By March 7, the city had 12 confirmed cases and New York Governor Andrew
Cuomo declared a statewide state of emergency. New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio moved the
city’s public school system to fully remote instruction on March 15. On Friday, March 20,
Governor Cuomo issued the New York PAUSE order beginning at 8 pm on March 22 (eventually
rescinded on May 28), forcing all non-essential businesses and public facilities in the state to
close, mandating social distancing, and limiting outdoor activities2. New York City was
transformed overnight, with affluent residents fleeing for second homes and rural rentals, while
those residents who remained largely stayed indoors and avoided streets, sidewalks, parks, and
transit systems.
Vehicular traffic on the city’s 6,000 miles of roadways dropped to an unprecedented low (Plitt
2020) and residents soon began seeking creative ways to exercise and spend time outdoors
safely. This led both Governor Cuomo and the Speaker of the New York City Council to publicly
request that Mayor de Blasio repurpose underutilized streets for recreational purposes. In
response, the mayor announced a Safe Streets pilot program for the weekend of March 27th–
30th, closing 1.6 miles of city streets from 10 am to 7 pm each day to provide car-free
recreational space in communities lacking adequate park space. Under continued pressure from
the governor and council speaker, the mayor later extended these street closures to April 5.
But this initial Safe Streets experiment was short lived. The mayor declined to extend the
program after April 5 citing underutilization by the public and the cost of New York City Police
Department (NYPD) oversight. The City Council subsequently introduced a bill on April 22
requiring the DOT to identify and implement 75 miles of car-free streets across the city.
2

2https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-new-york-state-pause-executive-order
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Five days later, the mayor unveiled a new Open Streets initiative to prioritize bicycling and
pedestrian access on 100 miles of city streets and sidewalks through street closures, sidewalk
widening, and new bike lanes. An initial 7.2 miles of pedestrian streets were implemented with
temporary barricades and signage on May 4, and 1.9 additional miles on May 7. The DOT
partnered with Businesses Improvement Districts, civic groups, and city agencies including
NYPD and NYC Parks to facilitate daily 8 am to 8pm closures. Community-based organizations
were also invited to propose additional Open Street locations and new locations were added to
the program throughout May and June. An overlapping Cool Streets program also provided
shade structures, fire hydrant spray caps, and other outdoor cooling tactics on Open Streets in
neighborhoods with high heat vulnerability risks. In July, ten Open Streets comprising slightly
less than 2 miles were also designated Play Streets offering outdoor recreation opportunities
and programming from partnering non-profit organizations including the Fresh Air Fund, the
Police Athletic League, and Street Lab.
3. Open Restaurants, Open Storefronts and Outdoor Learning
New York City’s bars and restaurants provide 15% of the city’s sales tax base and supply
317,800 jobs (Office of the New York State Comptroller 2020). The industry quickly seized on
the success of the Open Streets program as a potential economic lifeline for restaurants. In
mid-May, a group of City Council members and the Manhattan Borough President formally
requested that the city develop a plan to facilitate expanded outdoor dining3. While the city has
long allowed sidewalk dining in limited locations and created the Street Seats program in 2015,
these options had always been expensive and heavily regulated, constraining most restaurants’
ability to provide outdoor dining. On June 18, the city formally launched the Open Restaurants
program, providing expedited permits for sidewalk and parking space seating, as well as on
streets closed through the Open Streets program and pre-existing DOT-managed public plazas.
Originally in effect until October 31st, Open Restaurants was later made permanent and yearround; as of December 31, 2020, the program had 10,854 enrollees citywide, slightly more than
one-third of the city’s 28,896 bars and restaurants [see Table 1]. Within days of the program’s
launch, some restaurants had already received permits to commandeer adjacent parking areas
for seating with simple preliminary interventions becoming more sophisticated over the course
of the year [see Figures 1 and 2].

3

https://benkallos.com/press-release/letter-open-sidewalks-and-streets-restaurants-social-distanced-servicekallos-brewer.
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Total number of licensed
restaurants as of February,
2020
Total Open Restaurants
program participants
Open Restaurants program
participants as percentage
of total pre-pandemic
establishments
Open Restaurants program
roadway Seating
Open Restaurants program
sidewalk Seating
Open Restaurants program
roadway and sidewalk
Seating
Open Restaurants program
Open Streets seating

Bronx
2,559

Brooklyn
7,322

Manhattan
11,408

Queens
6,560

Staten Island
1,047

NYC Total
28,896

615

2,658

5,275

2,273

178

10,999

24.0%

36.3%

46.2%

34.6%

17.0%

38.1%

24

233

582

170

9

1,018

295

1,068

1,772

882

87

4,104

284

1,261

2,722

1,173

78

5,518

12

96

199

48

4

359

Table 1. New York City Open Restaurants Program Enrollees by Borough as of February 15, 2020. Courtesy of NYC
Open Restaurants Dashboard and NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.

Figure 1. Within days of the launch of the Open Restaurants program, simple outdoor seating areas like the one
above began appearing on city streets. Photo by the author.

Figure 2. By December, many restaurants had invested in more ambitious outdoor structures to entice customers
during less hospitable weather. Photo by the author.
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To support retail and service businesses, the city also created the Open Storefronts program at
the end of October, allowing businesses to use sidewalks for displaying retail goods, seating,
and queuing. Shops adjacent to an Open Street were also allowed to use the street space in
front of their business. Focused on the holiday shopping season, the program originally
operated from October 30 to December 31, and unlike the Open Restaurants program, did not
allow retailers to apply for use of adjacent parking spaces or build outdoor structures over 5 ft
tall. Later extended to September 30, 2021, the program has nonetheless proved less popular
than the Open Restaurants program, with only 687 participants citywide as of February 15,
2021.
After moving to online instruction in March, the mayor committed to reopening the city’s 1,606
public schools for in-person instruction by September of 2020. But the DOE initially appeared to
ignore advocates’ calls for the use of outdoor classrooms, only unveiling its Outdoor Learning
Initiative less than a month before the start of the school year. Despite the short application
window, more than 1,100 public, private, and charter schools applied to use schoolyards, city
parks, and closed streets for educational space. Almost all applicants were ultimately approved
including at least 85 that requested closing an adjacent street and more than 200 requesting to
use city park space (Elsen-Rooney 2020).
4. The 34th Avenue Open Street in Jackson Heights
While the Open Streets program was originally designed as a temporary emergency program,
some neighborhoods quickly began to advocate for the city to make Open Streets segments
permanent (Colon 2020). 34th Avenue, which bisects the Jackson Heights neighborhood in the
northern part of the Borough of Queens, illustrates how the Open Streets program evolved
from a weekend pilot program in March to calls for permanent street redesigns in some
neighborhoods a few months later.4 Jackson Heights and surrounding neighborhoods were the
epicenter of the city’s COVID-19 crisis in the spring of 2020 (Correal and Jacobs 2020) and are
located in one of the most park-starved corners of the city (New Yorkers for Parks 2010). Only
eight blocks of 34th Avenue were first designated as a pedestrian priority street in April, but
owing to advocacy by the neighborhood’s elected officials and local community groups, a 26
block (1.3 mile) stretch of the avenue was ultimately closed through traffic from 8 am to 8 pm,
with parking and 5 mph local access allowed. The 50-foot-wide two-way street and its planted
median quickly became a popular neighborhood resource for walking, jogging, bicycling,
outdoor exercise classes, and even passive relaxation [Knoll 2020; see Figure 3].
In early September, citing widespread community support, the neighborhood’s City Council
member issued a formal request to the DOT to make 34th Avenue a permanent car-free or
limited access street. A subsequent petition drive gathered over 1,500 signatures and hundreds
of local residents were joined by elected officials from across the city for a rally on October 24th

4

The author is a resident of Jackson Heights.
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demanding that the mayor designate 34th Avenue as a permanent Open Street [see Figure 4].
Within days, the
DOT committed to making long-term changes to 34th Avenue through a community-based
design process. The first of these events, an online “Information and Listening Session” hosted
by the DOT on December 2nd had more than 550 virtual attendees expressing strong and
varied opinions about the concept of redesigning 34th Avenue as a permanently automobilelimited thoroughfare. Simultaneously, other neighborhoods were making similar demands and
on January 28, 2021 Mayor de Blasio announced in his final State of the City speech that the
Open Streets program, along with a number of other pandemic streetscape programs, would be
made permanent although no specific details were provided (City of New York 2021). An Open
Culture program, created by the City Council, also went into effect in January 2021, providing a
legal mechanism for local arts and non-profit groups to use Open Streets for artistic and cultural
events (New York City Council 2020).

Figure 3. The 34th Avenue Open Street in Jackson Heights, Queens has become a well-used multi-use open space
for local residents. Photo by the author.

Figure 4. Jackson Heights residents organized a rally on October 24, 2020 to advocate for making 34th Avenue a
permanent Open Street. Photo by the author.
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5. How can Lessons from Previous Disasters Help Inform Ongoing COVID-19 Responses?
The COVID-19 pandemic has been a singularly calamitous event. After 11 months, the virus and
its associated economic and social repercussions continue to spread. Preventing COVID-19
replication while supporting local businesses and facilitating safe social interactions continue to
be critical goals, and the city’s responses continue to evolve. This section summarizes four
broad lessons from the study of previous disasters that are pertinent for helping city planners
and urban designers continue to effectively respond to this crisis.
5.1. Lesson 1: There is always opportunity in chaos
New York City’s experience with COVID-19 confirms one of the most longstanding lessons of
disaster recovery: chaos and destruction, paradoxically, always provide opportunities for
positive change. Among the earliest scholarly analyses of disasters, sociologist Prince’s (1920:
144) book Catastrophe and Social Change examined the December 6, 1917 munitions ship
explosion in Halifax, Novia Scotia that killed almost 2,000 people and injured 9,000 more.
Making an observation that has since become commonplace, Prince offered that the Halifax
explosion was both a tragedy and “preparation of the ground for an inrush of the spirit of
progress”. Plainly stated, while disasters can cause horrific pain and destruction, they can also
generate opportunities for creative recovery that will make communities better off in the long
run. When weather-related or geophysical hazards cause physical destruction, damaged
buildings and infrastructure can be replaced with more resilient structures, while citizens and
local officials are willing to consider changes that address newfound risks the disaster has
exposed (Rubin et al. 1985). While COVID-19 lacks the physical destruction of an earthquake or
tornado, the willingness to accept a “new normal” — even if temporarily — has provided a
window of opportunity for urban design and planning approaches that might have never been
politically feasible without the urgency of the pandemic and the need to balance hazard
mitigation with other urban development goals (Berke et al. 1993). Over one-third of city
restaurants are currently participating in the Open Restaurants program, and while this is
insufficient to support restaurants indefinitely, the program has been popular with the public.
Despite some challenges, Open Streets projects such as 34th Avenue have also been locally
popular, and now both programs have been made permanent by the mayor. In a city that has
often struggled with bureaucratic inertia in its efforts to make the public realm more pedestrian
and bicycle friendly, the pandemic has facilitated actions that might have taken decades or
never happened otherwise.
5.2. Lesson 2: Understanding system complexity is central to effective disaster response
To effectively address the urgent, interconnected, and cascading elements of disaster response
and mitigation of future hazards, cities have to think strategically, act proactively, and embrace
complexity as opposed to relying only on discrete tactics that are ad hoc, reactive, and
piecemeal (Dynes et al. 1972; Rubin et al. 1985; Alesch and Siembieda 2012). New York’s urban
design responses to COVID-19 illustrate this challenge of operating with a context of extreme
complexity while still moving quickly to address urgent challenges.
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For example, the Open Restaurants program continues to face new challenges as the city
attempts to integrate the program into its existing regulatory apparatus. Some restaurant
owners have spent tens of thousands of dollars upgrading outdoor dining structures, many of
which are now fully enclosed with heat and electricity. But this raises new questions that the
existing programs and attendant bureaucracy are poorly equipped to deal with: Are these
structures still under the purview of the DOT because they sit on streets and sidewalks? Or
have they in fact become “buildings” under the jurisdiction of the Department of Buildings?
When “indoor” dining is restricted because of increasing COVID-19 caseloads in the city, are
these structures allowed to remain in operation even though they may lack the efficient airhandling mechanisms available inside some restaurants? Is it more important to prioritize
outdoor dining or transportation on public thoroughfares (e.g., Ricciulli 2020)? When a
December snowstorm dropped six inches of snow on the city, the mayor temporarily
suspended the Open Streets program and suggested that restaurants remove their dining
structures from the streets to facilitate snow plowing, even though many such structures are
essentially small buildings that cannot be easily moved (Gold 2020). In addition to this shifting
landscape of evolving and sometimes contradictory rules and regulations, inconsistencies
between state and city policies have also been a source of consternation for business owners.
Finding a balance across the city’s various regulatory, economic and infrastructure systems,
while facilitating economic activity and enforcing public safety, will be ongoing challenges as
the city struggles to create a lifeline for small businesses and avoid overly punitive enforcement
of sometimes confusing regulations.
5.3. Lesson 3: Effective response demands a balance between planning and acting
Every disaster is unique and recovery programs must always be developed anew in the midst of
a crisis while responding to evolving needs in real time (Finn and Marshall 2018), resembling
the process of “building the plane while it is in flight” (Leicht 2017). Most of the programs
reported here had to be designed and scaled up in a short timeframe with no opportunity to
test them first, leading to sometimes chaotic implementation. This highlights a central paradox
of disaster management, the need to “slow down to speed up” (Chandrasekhar et al. 2014:
381) and find a balance between quick action and deliberative decision-making (Olshansky
2006; Olshansky and Johnson 2010). In normal times, new policies are carefully planned,
thoroughly analyzed, and implemented slowly in order to identify potential problems. Spending
valuable time to refine and perfect new strategies after a disaster means foregoing
opportunities to address pressing needs, but finding this balance is important. While New York
moved slowly in comparison to cities like Oakland, CA and Paris, France, it is also clear that the
city’s efforts could have nonetheless benefitted from even a brief period of strategic
engagement with restaurant owners, Safe Streets advocates, educators, and other stakeholders
during the planning stages. This approach might have helped identify some of the key
challenges that the programs would ultimately face. Instead, the city was relatively slow to take
action in comparison to many peer communities, and yet still failed to use that extra time to
engage in robust stakeholder engagement.
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5.4. Lesson 4: Effective post-disaster governance mostly happens before the disaster
A final lesson of the COVID-19 pandemic that is consistent with previous disasters relates to the
role of bureaucracies in the recovery process. Governments, because of the inherent
characteristics of bureaucracies, often serve as barriers to effective recovery even as they
attempt to empower it. In many cases new organizations or systems are created to facilitate
recovery because there is a need to circumvent existing ponderous bureaucratic systems
(Johnson and Olshansky 2017). In order to be most effective, New York City realized early in the
pandemic that heavy-handed, top-down approaches would be ineffectual in the COVID context,
and additionally, were beyond the financial means of a city in economic freefall. Instead, city
officials recognized quickly that the city could serve its constituents best by providing
information, flexible recovery programs, and technical support, empowering local residents to
innovate, move quickly, and thus facilitate their own recovery. For the most part, New York City
achieved this by looking to existing programs like the DOT Public Plaza and Street Seats
programs, which provided frameworks that could be scaled up quickly and effectively with
simplified permitting processes, limited government oversight, and wide latitude, with the
expectation that problematic implementation challenges could be addressed only when and if
they arose. After that, the city mostly got out of the way and allowed neighborhood groups,
restaurant owners, Business Improvement Districts, and other stakeholders to innovate as their
resources allowed and location conditions dictated. Thus, one important lesson for cities is that
pre-disaster preparation strategies should in part emphasize empowering residents and
entrepreneurs by building civic and economic capacity at the local level, so that they are better
equipped to act as agents of their own recovery when the need arises (Campanella 2006).
6. How do New York City’s Experiences Contribute to Better Disaster Response in the Future?
Lessons learned by New York and other cities will undoubtedly contribute to the ongoing
evolution of disaster management in the future. But it will be important to monitor how
effective these efforts are at supporting local businesses and addressing other goals over the
longer term. Further analysis of the city’s COVID-19 response should focus on three important
topics.
The first issue relates to the social equity considerations of these programs. While the city has
created systems for creatively using public space that were almost unimaginable before COVID19 emerged, they nonetheless shift much of the burden for costs and administration onto
community members, local non-profit groups, and small business owners. Many of New York’s
most densely populated neighborhoods — which need social distancing and outdoor recreation
opportunities the most — are also low-income communities of color that may lack the
kinds of formal social capital necessary to help operate an Open Street in partnership with the
city. In Jackson Heights, for example, advocacy for creating and expanding the 34th Avenue
Open Street was only successful because it harnessed the human capital built from more than a
decade of concerted neighborhood organizing around street safety and open space access (e.g.,
Kazis 2010). Likewise, schools that were able to purchase equipment to participate in the DOE’s
Outdoor Learning Initiative often did so through donations from affluent parents while schools
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without such resources were unable to avail themselves of these opportunities. Other equity
issues also deserve ongoing scrutiny. For instance, people with disabilities, bicyclists, young
parents pushing strollers, and other groups may be negatively impacted by a more cluttered
and complex streetscape. The use of public streets by for-profit businesses has also been a
subject of debate, though the general consensus among city residents seems to suggest that
the vitality of each neighborhood is so dependent on its local businesses that the inherent
tradeoffs are worth making. It will be important to monitor the implications of this as the
immediate crisis recedes.
The second issue relates to economic equity. Allowing restaurants and stores to utilize public
space for commercial purposes is creative, but it is only a partial solution for many businesses,
and no solution at all for others. Many shops and restaurants — especially small businesses in
lower income neighborhoods — lack the resources to purchase the infrastructure necessary to
support a shift to outdoor dining or retail sales. Businesses located in narrow storefronts, upper
floors, next to a bus stop or fire hydrant, or along narrow streets and sidewalks will likewise be
left out. Some restaurants have also reported being aggressively ticketed by the NYPD and the
New York State Liquor Authority for minor infractions. Unless logistical and operational
challenges, financial limitations, and enforcement inequities are addressed alongside the more
technical urban design issues, these well-meaning programs will fail to help many of the most
vulnerable businesses by creating new sets of challenges that cancel out any potential benefits.
Finally, safety must continue to be a paramount concern. The city has not yet allocated any
capital funds for permanent design changes that would enhance the safety of these programs.
Though they are experimental solutions developed during a crisis, these efforts will require
further refinement in order to be sustainable and safe. For instance, the city will need to
balance the economic imperative for allowing outdoor dining and recreation with public safety.
Open Streets and Open Restaurants locations create automobile crash risks for pedestrians and
diners, and in some locations drivers have begun to ignore the ad hoc signage and protective
devices delineating Open Streets locations. Many Open Restaurants participants have built
ambitious outdoor seating facilities but limited oversight from the DOT and DOB — as well as
sparse inspections and enforcement — also means that some structures may present a safety
risk during a hurricane or when loaded with a foot of wet snow. Evolving more ambitious design
standards for Open Streets and Open Restaurants locations, allocating capital funding to create
permanent safety improvements, as well as prioritizing traffic and code enforcement, will be
important to maintain public safety going forward.
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Figure 5. Confusing regulations and uneven enforcement have occasionally resulted in Open Restaurants designs
that cause public safety and public access concerns. Photo by the author.

7. Conclusion
Creative reimagining of the public realm has been a small but important piece of New York
City’s COVID-19 mitigation and recovery strategy. In less than a year, the city’s streetscape has
been drastically altered to allow for both social distancing and economic activity. Creating the
policies and programs to support these changes has been uneven and imperfect, but this is
expected in rapidly evolving, resource-and-information constrained crisis situations. The
qualified successes, nevertheless, illustrate what is possible when a crisis empowers action. The
programs that have allowed the city to muddle through the first year of the pandemic have
been improvisational and experimental and were not designed to be permanent. But as the
pandemic stretches into 2021 and its associated economic crisis continues unabated, it appears
increasingly likely that many of these emergency measures have proved successful and have
public support. When COVID-19 risks finally begin to recede, these temporary response
strategies will need to be rethought as permanent policies and structural changes to the
cityscape. That will require a systematic review of what has worked well and what has failed, in
addition to overcoming some of the key operational and social equity challenges identified
above.
Acknowledgments: The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful
comments. Rob Olshansky and Gordon Douglas also provided insightful suggestions and
opportunities to work through some of the arguments presented here.
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